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1 INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, the abuse of public power for private gain, can impose an additional cost on many transactions 
and activities. Fisman and Svensson (2007) point out that corruption could act like a tax or on the other hand 
it may help (some) firms to overcome excessive bureaucracy and red tape. Corruption has also been found to 
be negatively associated with many macroeconomic conditions, the presence of which could discourage 
foreign investment. Foreign investors, like domestic investors, will take account of these costs when making 
their investment decisions. 
 
This paper contributes to a long standing literature that has tended to find that corruption, as measured by 
expert’s perceptions, is detrimental in terms of a country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) performance. We 
allow both perceptions of corruption and firms’ experiences of corruption to enter into an empirical FDI 
model as separate and distinct variables. After illustrating that these variables can tell very different stories 
about the extent of corruption in a country, we show that perceptions based measures are strongly associated 
with FDI while experience based measures are not, even when perceptions are not included in the model. 
However, we do find some evidence that experiences trump perceptions when it comes to greenfield 
investment. 
 
Until relatively recently, corruption has been measured and compared internationally using measures that are, 
for the most part, based on the perceptions of experts. However, recent years have seen the emergence of 
large survey based datasets that contain corruption indicators based on the experiences of firms. While 
perception based indicators have allowed academics to understand corruption better and helped the media to 
shine a light on corruption, researchers have long been aware of the shortcomings inherent in such measures. 
Svensson (2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2006), Treisman (2007), and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) all 
raise concerns that perception indices are likely to suffer from perception biases. Knack (2007) and Kenny 
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(2009) suggest that perception indicators lag reality. On the other hand, experience based measures from 
appropriately designed surveys can yield “hard evidence on corruption” (Svensson (2005)). Knack (2007) 
stresses that survey based measures can “place a greater emphasis on experience and less on perceptions” (p. 
257) and that “[i]n contrast to most expert assessments, surveys of firms and households generate data likely 
to be largely independent from other judgments” (p. 266). Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) compare 
individuals’ experiences of corruption with a survey of experts’ opinions for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
conclude that there are differences between the two and that there are ideological and cultural biases in the 
experts’ evaluations of corruption. 
 
There is a large empirical literature that examines the effect of corruption on FDI, almost always using 
perceptions based indicators. Wei (2000a) studies the effect of corruption on FDI using bilateral investment 
data and finds that corruption reduces FDI significantly and substantially. Wei (2000b) finds that corruption 
plays a role in shaping both the composition of the FDI that a country receives and the magnitude. Hakkala, 
Nörback and Svaleryd (2008) use firm level data from Sweden to show that higher corruption in a country 
reduces the probability that a firm will invest there. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) examine the effect of 
corruption in the host and receiving countries on FDI. They find a negative effect of host country corruption 
and of the difference between corruption levels between the host and receiving countries on FDI. Egger and 
Winner (2006) examine outward FDI stocks of OECD countries and find that the overall effect of corruption 
is negative.  
 
At the subnational level, Cole, Elliott and Zhang (2009) find that FDI is more attracted to Chinese provinces 
that are actively fighting against corruption. Ledyaeva, Karhunen and Kosonen (2013) study Russian regions 
and find that foreign investors tend to pick regions that are similar to their host countries in terms of where 
they are on the (relative) corruption and democracy spectra. A related contribution is provided by Morrissey 
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and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) who conclude that “increased FDI under political stability and low corruption 
has the greatest impact on increasing total private investment”(p.443).  
 
Corruption has been shown to matter for FDI even when one considers other important factors. Using a 
survey based measure Asiedu (2006) finds corruption to have a negative effect on FDI to countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa but that countries in the region that attract the most FDI are either resource-rich or have 
significant market size. Good infrastructure, an educated labour force, macroeconomic and political stability, 
openness to FDI and an efficient legal system are also important. With a survey data of French civil servants 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) study the impact of institutional quality on bilateral FDI. They 
find that corruption is important alongside measures of the quality of banking sector and general legal 
institutions. Similarly, Busse and Hefeker (2007) find institutional quality matters for FDI though they find a 
weaker relationship between corruption and FDI flows than with other political factors such as government 
stability, conflicts, law and order, ethnic tensions and bureaucratic quality. Daude and Stein (2007) also study 
the effect of institutional quality on FDI. They point out that indicators based on expert evaluations on one 
hand and surveys on the other hand might yield different results. They find that a survey based measure of 
corruption similar to one that we employ in this paper is insignificant though they do not include perceptions 
and this measure at the same time. They also fail to find a significant effect of the standard corruption 
measures on FDI which puts them at odds with much of the literature. 
 
This is just a small sample of this literature consisting of the most relevant and important papers. The weight 
of evidence suggests that corruption is undesirable in terms of attracting FDI, though there are some papers 
that fail to find a relationship such as Daude and Stein (2007) while Egger and Winner (2005) find that 
corruption is beneficial in terms of FDI in both the short and long run. This paper clearly builds on this 
literature by asking whether perceptions of corruption, the reality of corruption, or both matter for FDI. 
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When perceptions differ from the experiences of firms, which should matter? Should one matter more than 
the other? These are empirical questions but we can think of reasons as to why each could matter. The 
experience based measures are probably the more relevant of the two in that they capture the actual situation 
faced by firms and they are exclusively concerned with firms whereas the other measures may pick up 
corruption that affects individuals. However, the perceptions measures, particularly the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) which receives a lot of media attention and is easily accessed in a user friendly way, 
are perhaps the data that foreign investors actually see.  
 
Results from other literatures offers little guidance as to which we should expect to matter. Gillanders (2014) 
finds that both perceptions based measures and experience based measures individually predict infrastructure 
quality. However, Aidt (2009) shows that when you switch from perceptions to experience based measures 
the links between corruption and economic growth disappear (though he only has an experience based 
measure for 1999-2000 and uses this to explain growth from 1970-2000). It is therefore important to note that 
the context may matter. Different underlying mechanisms and decision making processes are likely to result 
in different conclusions regarding the importance and relative importance of perceptions and experience 
based measures. 
 
We begin by outlining the data used and then show that perceptions can differ from experience in many 
cases. Section 4 shows that perceptions are significantly and meaningfully associated with good FDI 
outcomes in general while the experience based measures are not, though greenfield investment may be 
different. Section 5 concludes and briefly discusses the implications of these findings for policy and the 
caveats to the analysis. 
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2 DATA 
In this section we define and discuss our dependent variables and independent variables of interest. Table A1 
in the appendix gives definitions and sources for all the variables used in our analysis. We obtained our 
information on FDI from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database. 
The UNCTAD WIR Methodological Note (2013) defines FDI inflows as “an investment involving a long-
term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign 
direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign 
direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate) ” (p.2). 
Our main measure of FDI is net FDI inflows. This consists of the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings or intra-company loans or debt. The inflow data is recorded in net terms implying that if net FDI 
inflows appear negative, at least one of its three components is negative and is not offset by positive amounts 
of the other components. We also examine the net values of greenfield investments and M&A (Mergers & 
Acquisitions) sales by destination country, which are also obtained from the UNCTAD database. Greenfield 
investments are investments that entail operations built from zero, or in other words the foreign entity does 
not acquire a share in an existing company in the host country.  The value of Greenfield investments are 
collected by fDi markets of the Financial Times for UNCTAD. The greenfield data may include investments 
that are not qualified as FDI because information on the equity share is not always available.  In addition, the 
UNCTAD methodological annex states that in the greenfield data “joint-ventures are also included only 
where they lead to a new physical operation. While there is no minimum size for a project to be included, as 
a selection criteria for inclusion in this database an investment project has to create new direct jobs and 
capital investment” (UNCTAD WIR 2013, p. 66). M&A investments on the other hand are the net sum of 
sales of existing companies or shares in them. The information in the UNCTAD cross-border M&A statistics 
are collected by Thomson Reuters. The M&A data consist of the values of equity sales as well as the 
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purchases via domestic and international capital markets, which should not be considered as FDI flows. 
Therefore, the M&A statistics correspond to the definition of FDI only in the case of equity sales. All data 
were converted to constant 2005 US$. 
 
The most widely used measure of corruption is the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), which gives countries a score on their perceived corruption from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly 
corrupt).1 The CPI is primarily based on expert views and according to the CPI 2013 methodology the index 
is based on information “drawn from data sources of independent institutions specializing in governance and 
business climate analysis”.2 Some of these sources can be based on surveys of “business leaders” in the 
country but the sample size of these surveys tend to be very small, they are unlikely to be representative, and 
most such sources only cover a small number of countries. 
 
As an alternative perceptions based measure of corruption we us the Control of Corruption (CC) variable 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. CC ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and is a composite 
index of surveys on households and firms as well as expert views from different organizations. The WGI 
indicators methodology as defined by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) describes CC as measuring “the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” Despite aggregating its source data 
in a more complicated way, CC tells a very similar story to the CPI as the two are econometrically very 
similar with a correlation of 0.92. 
 
As we saw in Section 1 above, leading scholars of corruption have expressed several concerns about 
perceptions measures. Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) capture perfectly what is perhaps the chief concern of 
corruption researchers regarding perceptions based measures: 
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“…perceived corruption indices … rely on the aggregated perceptions of businessmen or country experts, 
many of whom may have formed impressions – perhaps subconsciously – based on common press depictions 
of countries or conventional notions about what institutions or cultures are conducive to corruption”(p.15). 
 
They support this assertion with the findings of Treisman (2007) that while characteristics such as the extent 
of democracy, press freedom, oil rents, and the percentage of women in government can explain variation in 
perceptions of corruption, once one controls for income these factors do not explain experience based 
measures. Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) suggest that “the businessmen and experts whose perceptions are 
being tapped might be inferring corruption levels from its hypothesized causes”(p.15). 
 
Such perception biases have also been alluded to by other scholars of corruption (e.g. Svensson (2003) and 
Reinikka and Svensson (2006)) and have been shown to exist in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa by 
Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010), but other issues have also been raised. For example, Knack (2007) 
points out that composite indices have no explicit definition due to the many, often quite different, sources 
used to create them and that the implicit definition changes over time as the source information changes. 
Both Knack (2007) and Kenny (2009) argue that changes in perceptions based measures tend to lag reality “if 
they have anything to do with reality at all” (Knack 2007, p. 265). 
 
Thus while traditional perceptions/composite indicators have served researchers, policymakers and 
journalists well in the past, there are strong reasons to seek alternative measures that are less likely to suffer 
from these perception biases and other issues. For researchers interested in international comparisons, 
evidence from well-designed standardised surveys can provide batteries of interesting corruption measures. 
Svensson (2005) and Reinikka and Svensson (2006) argue that properly conducted surveys of firms can 
provide reliable “hard” evidence on corruption. Knack (2007) argues that such exercises can yield measures 
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of corruption that are based on the experience of corruption rather than perceptions and that are less likely to 
be influenced by other judgements and the judgements of others.  
 
The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES) contain a wide range of information on firms in wide range of 
countries. The ES are representative firm level surveys that ask several questions about firms’ experiences of 
corruption.3 They are carefully designed and implemented and have been much used in recent years by 
researchers interested in corruption. We use three variables from the ES macro dataset to measure corruption. 
Each is somewhat different and thus, if they are in agreement, we can have more confidence in our findings. 
 
The three ES corruption measures that we use are the percent of firms that see corruption as a major 
constraint to their business (Constraint), the percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment 
was requested (Depth) and the percent of firms that are expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things 
done" (Gifts). Each of these variables takes a slightly different approach to measuring corruption. Constraint 
comes from a question that asks respondents if corruption is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, major obstacle, or 
a very severe obstacle to the current operations of their establishment. The vagueness of this question is part 
of its appeal. It does not ask specifically about specific bribe amounts or frequencies which people may 
intentionally or unintentionally misreport. Besides this, corruption can manifest itself in ways other than 
bribes. As alternatives to this measure of corruption, we use two variables that do focus on bribery as the 
main modality of corruption. Depth and Gifts differ though in that the former asks directly about the 
respondent’s own firm, as does Constraint, while the latter was compiled from answers referring to a “firm 
with similar characteristics to yours.” This is done to draw out honest answers. Thus we have a set of 
indicators based on firm’s experiences that are each subtly different from the others. Depth and Gifts are 
strongly correlated with each other (0.78) while Constraint has a weak correlation (0.23 and 0.14) with the 
two other experience based measures.  
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Our combined dataset includes 135 different countries and covers years from 2002 to 2013. The countries in 
the survey are, however, very unevenly represented during the eleven years of yearly survey rounds and the 
resulting panel data is very unbalanced. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
3 DO PERCEPTIONS MATCH EXPERIENCES? 
 
In this section we show that the conclusions one might draw from perceptions measures can be very different 
from the story according to experience based measures. Treisman (2007) found somewhat strong correlations 
between perceptions based measures and experience based measures (roughly between 0.6 and 0.8) though 
he notes that the correlation is weaker if one focuses on developing countries. We find weaker correlations 
between our perceptions and experience based measures (between 0.40 and 0.52) and when we examine the 
data visually we can see many countries that seem to have undeserved reputations – at least by these metrics. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the CPI and measures based on firms reported experiences can tell quite 
different stories about the corruption situation in a country. Moreover, this seems to apply even though the 
three indicators of experienced corruption each takes a slightly different approach to measuring the 
corruption experiences of firms. Figure 1 shows that the CPI and Constraint are rather weakly correlated (-
0.4) with each other. The correlations remain relatively weak between Gifts and the CPI (-0.48) and Depth 
and the CPI (-0.5) as can be seen in figures 2 and 3. 
 
The figures are divided into four quadrants defined by the sample means. Immediately one can see that there 
exist a significant number of countries with an unearned corruption reputation either in that they are 
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perceived as corrupt but are not according to firms’ actual experiences or are perceived as “clean” but are not 
according to firms’ experiences, with the first group being far larger. Furthermore, it is important to note here 
that our sample average for the CPI is rather low (3.3 out of 10)  since we are missing Enterprise Surveys 
information on most of the least corrupt countries in the world such as the Nordic countries and New 
Zealand. 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
Figures 4 to 6 present the same relationships on world maps. This allows us to see clearly how closely the 
experience based measures match the CPI as well as how this degree of agreement is distributed 
geographically.4 In most regions of the world we can point to countries where perceptions do not match 
reality. In addition, some interesting geographical patterns exist. For example, much of Africa (except for the 
very south) is perceived to be corrupt however perceptions do not match reality in many parts of East-Africa. 
Clusters can also be observed in Europe. For the most part in Western European and EU countries 
perceptions of low corruption match the experience based measures. However, some newly acceded EU 
countries and Balkans countries have low perceptions of corruption but are corrupt by the Constraint 
measure.  This could indicate that these countries are benefiting in terms of perceptions from the proximity of 
very clean countries and possibly EU membership even though firms feel that corruption is constraining their 
operations.  
 
Amongst Asian countries in general it is hard to see any common patterns. Many of the Central Asian 
countries in our sample are perceived to be corrupt and this is largely in agreement with the experience based 
measures. Central and Latin American countries, however, show considerable disagreement both between 
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perceptions and experience measures and also between different experience measures. This discrepancy 
could indicate that firms in Central and Latin American countries do not see giving gifts or paying bribes as a 
constraint or these more traditional forms of corruption are very limited in scale and that firms are plagued by 
other more subtle forms of corruption (such as nepotism or old boy networks). Similar differences between 
the different experience based indicators can be seen in Turkey and the Balkans, which share a long common 
history under the former Ottoman Empire.  
<FIGURE 4 HERE> 
<FIGURE 5 HERE> 
<FIGURE 6 HERE> 
 
The conclusions one can draw from this presentation of the raw data are that there are, by the measures 
available to us, large numbers of countries that have an unearned or undeserved reputation for corruption and 
that there are “reputation blocks” of countries that share certain geographic and historical traits. While for the 
purposes of this paper it is sufficient to observe that differences between perceptions and experience based 
measures exist, the existence of these clusters is very interesting and warrants further and full study. 
Certainly the existence of these blocks brings to mind the argument of Fan et al. (2009) quoted above 
regarding perceptions being driven by expectations based on culture and history rather than by actual 
corruption. These findings also tie in well with the finding of Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) that 
experts may have a model of “how Africa works” in their minds. 
 
4 PERCEPTIONS, EXPERIENCES AND FDI 
4.1 Approach 
Having established that there is often a difference between the widely reported perceptions of corruption in a 
country and the experience of firms in that country, we ask if perceptions or actual experience or both matter 
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in terms of the amount of FDI a country attracts. As outlined above, there is a longstanding literature that, for 
the most part, shows that the degree of corruption in a country, usually measured with a perceptions based 
measure, is negatively associated with inward FDI. 
 
To investigate the importance of perceptions and experience based measures in terms of FDI, we estimate 
models of the following general form with OLS on our unbalanced panel data: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  Γ𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 is the natural logarithm of total net inflow of FDI in country i at time t,  𝛼 is the intercept term,  
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of perceived corruption and/or experienced corruption, X contains different 
control variables described below and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term of the standard type.  
 
There are obvious endogeneity concerns one might have with this approach. Unfortunately the data is not 
suitable for the GMM solutions that others have used and it is very difficult to think of valid instruments for 
two measures of corruption – especially in the context of FDI. This is not an uncommon issue with empirical 
FDI papers (see e.g. Chung (2014)). Even though the results may not be causal, we think they will be of 
interest for policy makers.  
 
4.2 Main Results 
Table 2 presents our main results. The first two columns show that our two perceptions measures are strongly 
and meaningfully correlated with FDI.5 The results tell us that countries with lower perceived corruption tend 
to attract more FDI. The magnitude of this association is similar in both cases. A ten percent change in either 
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index (1 unit for CPI which runs from 0-10 and 0.5 of a unit for the CC measure which takes values between 
-2.5 and 2.5) is associated with an increase of around 28% to 49% in FDI inflows. This is clearly a very large 
“effect” but such large associations have been found by others e.g. Wei (2000a) and Asiedu (2006). 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
However, our experience based corruption measures are not significantly associated with FDI in general and 
the size of the estimated association is much smaller. This can be seen in columns 3, 4, and 5. The remaining 
columns pair each of the perceptions measures with each of the experience based measures. These 
regressions suggest that it is perceptions that matter for FDI and not the reality as captured by the experience 
measures we have. In one instance the experience based measure Gifts is weakly significant and only in one 
case is the perceptions measure insignificant.6 This is in Column 10 where we pair CC with the Depth 
measure. This is likely due to the smaller sample size as when we use Depth in Column 7 with the CPI, the 
significance of the latter drops to 10%. 
 
Thus, these simple regressions tell a clear story. The experience of corruption, which we have seen can be 
very different from perceptions, is not an important factor in terms of a country’s ability to attract FDI. Even 
when we exclude the perceptions measures, the experience based measures do not predict FDI. Why might 
this be? As argued above, investors should probably care about the reality of corruption and not the 
perception. However, until recently experience based measures were hard to come by while the CPI is widely 
reported, free to access, and presented in a user-friendly way. In other words, investors concerned about 
corruption are likely to use the CPI as their metric. 
 
Another explanation is that a given operating environment could affect a global multinational corporation 
differently than a local entrepreneur. For example, in Russia the operating environment is not the same for all 
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and whether a company is targeted can depend on informal networks (see for example Aidis and Adachi 
(2007)). Sometimes foreigners are targeted more and sometimes not.  Billon and Gillanders (2014) show that 
firms with more foreign ownership do indeed face a statistically significantly lower burden of corruption in 
that they pay less in bribes and tend to find corruption to be less of a constraint to their operations. However, 
the sizes of these effects are not very large and are only evident in a sample of Eastern European and Central 
Asian economies. Thus, we tend to favour the first explanation though the two are not mutually exclusive. 
 
4.3 Controls 
Having uncovered this simple relationship, we now show that it is still evident when we include several 
important factors commonly used in the empirical FDI literature. We allow for trade costs to enter the 
specification as proxied for by the inverse of openness to international trade.7 To control for market size and 
development we include a population variable and income category dummies from the World Bank.8 We 
follow the literature (e.g. Blonigen et al. (2007)) and include the sum of distance weighted GDP of other 
countries to measure surrounding market potential. In line with Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) we 
control for the skill level in a country by using data on expected years of schooling. Finally we include 
dummies for landlocked and island nations to allow for potentially important geographical considerations. 
All variables are defined fully in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results using CPI and CC respectively. These factors are signed as one would 
expect. Poorer countries tend to attract less in FDI than richer countries while countries with larger 
populations attract more, as do those with a more skilled work force and a larger surrounding market 
potential, though this later factor is not robustly significant. Trade costs are always a significant and negative 
correlate of FDI as is being landlocked while the island dummy is never significant. While the magnitude of 
14 
 
the relationships between corruption and FDI are smaller than those in Table 2 they are still sizable and 
slightly stronger in terms of statistical significance. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that the our main result, that perceptions of corruption matter for FDI while the 
experience of corruption does not, is robust to the inclusion of standard FDI controls. In the future it will 
become possible, and desirable, to revisit this question armed with the full arsenal of panel data techniques. 
However even these simple correlations that are robust to the inclusion of other important factors tell a story 
that should be of great interest to policymakers. Countries that wish to attract more FDI should, according to 
these results, focus on improving their ratings on perceptions of corruption measures and not on reducing the 
reality of corruption as firms experience it (though this is a worthy goal for other reasons and in and of itself). 
However, we want to stress that this relationship may change as experience based measures become more 
well-known.  
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
4.4 Are Greenfield and M&A Investment Different? 
One can readily imagine that different modes of investment may stand in different relation to different 
measures of corruption. Foreign investors can enter a market through buying equity shares in a domestic 
company (mergers and acquisitions or M&A investment) or build their operations from zero (greenfield 
investment). There are many reasons that could lead investors to favour one method of investing over the 
other. For example, building new operations from zero in a foreign country can entail more risk than 
acquiring an already locally established company (Dikova and Witteloostuijn 2007). Another possible factor 
is that more R&D intensive companies may prefer to use greenfield investment which can reduce the 
likelihood of their innovations being transmitted unintentionally. 
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In this section, we investigate whether the importance of experience based measures of corruption and 
perception based measures change with the mode of investment (greenfield or M&A). To measure these 
quantities, we use the net inflows of greenfield and M&A investment variables from UNCTAD. Globerman 
and Shapiro (2005) have also used UNCTAD data to study cross-border M&A investment and conclude that 
factors that are found to be influencing the overall levels of FDI inflows into a country might not have the 
same effect on all modes of investment. Neto, Brandão and Cerqueira (2010) have also used the same data 
for comparison of greenfield and M&A investment and they find that there are some mode-specific 
macroeconomic variables. They find for example that good governance (measured with WGI indicators) is 
significant for both modes of establishment but that cultural distance is only important for greenfield 
investment. Furthermore, Ayça (2012) has used firm-level data on Swedish MNCs and found that 
perceptions based measures of corruption have a negative effect on greenfield investment and a weak 
positive effect on M&A investment but that the effect of corruption is alleviated by the company’s 
international experience. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of regressions using the net value of greenfield and M&A investment as 
dependent variables with all the controls used in tables 3 an 4. When we exclude the experience measures, 
the CPI is a significant correlate of both types of FDI and this is also true for the most part when we include 
Depth and Gifts. However, Constraint is significantly correlated with greenfield investments though not with 
M&A investment. When Constraint is included perceptions no longer have a significant association with 
greenfield investment. These results could arise from a tendency for firms engaging in greenfield investment 
to investigate the local situation more carefully for themselves as they do not have the help of already 
established networks and facilities that come with a company already in operation. Investors in a greenfield 
project will most likely need to assess the local risks more carefully anyway as this form of investment is in 
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itself already more risky than M&A. Given that we do not find any significant associations with the other 
experience measures, it may be the case that bribery is not seen as a problem, or a constraint, per se.  
 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
Thus we have some evidence that the two modes of investment are different from each other with regards to 
their association with corruption indicators. While M&A responds to perceptions of corruption, greenfield 
may be driven more by the actual degree to which corruption is a hindrance to firms on the ground. Once 
again this has some interesting implications for policymakers as there may be some role for actual 
improvements in corruption to play a role. Countries that make corruption less of an obstacle for firms may 
see some additional greenfield FDI even if the perception of corruption in their country remains unchanged.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown that perceptions of corruption in a country can differ substantially from firms’ 
experiences of corruption and, as things stand now, it is perceptions that seem to be associated with the 
amount of FDI that a country attracts in general. While others have shown that improvements in perceptions 
measures matter, we add a new dimension to the policy prescription by showing that improving the reality of 
corruption, holding perceptions constant, does not seem to be related to any benefit in terms of overall FDI. 
However, we did find some evidence that reality may dominate perceptions when it comes to greenfield 
investment. We do not consider here whether the experience on the ground has any effect on perceptions 
measures as this is an important question that warrants a full and careful analysis. However, we have seen 
that the two concepts are not very strongly correlated and Treisman (2007) has shown that the two are 
correlated with different factors. 
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As experience based measures become more well-known and expand in their country coverage these 
relationships may change but for now our findings imply that governments interested in attracting FDI would 
do well to improve their standing with regards to perceptions based measures like the Corruption Perceptions 
Index even if this improvement is not associated with an improvement in the reality of corruption. It will be 
interesting to revisit these issues again in the future not only due to the fact that the relationships may change 
but also because the continuation of the Enterprise Surveys over time will allow one to employ methods that 
can help to make strong arguments for causality.  
 
REFERENCES 
Aidis, R., & Adachi, Y. (2007). Russia: Firm entry and survival barriers. Economic Systems, 31(4), 391-411. 
Aidt, T. S. (2009). Corruption, institutions, and economic development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
25(2), 271-291. 
Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, 
government policy, institutions and political instability. The World Economy, 29(1), 63-77. 
Ayca, T. K. (2012). Cross-border M&As vs. Greenfield Investments: Does Corruption Make a Difference?.  
Bénassy‐Quéré, A., Coupet, M., & Mayer, T. (2007). Institutional determinants of foreign direct investment. 
The World Economy, 30(5), 764-782. 
Billon, Steve & Robert Gillanders (2014), State Ownership and Corruption, HECER Discussion Paper No. 
378. 
Blonigen, B. A., Davies, R. B., Waddell, G. R., & Naughton, H. T. (2007). FDI in space: Spatial 
autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment. European Economic Review, 51(5), 1303-1325. 
Busse, M., & Hefeker, C. (2007). Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment. European journal 
of political economy, 23(2), 397-415. 
18 
 
Carr D.L., Markusen J.R. & Maskus K.E. (2001). Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the 
Multinational Enterprise. The American Economic Review, 91(3),  693-708. 
CEPII (2014). GeoDist Dataset 
available from: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp 
Chung, S. (2014). Environmental Regulation and Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from South Korea. 
Journal of Development Economics. 
Cole, M. A., Elliott, R. J., & Zhang, J. (2009). Corruption, governance and FDI location in China: A 
province-level analysis. The Journal of Development Studies, 45(9), 1494-1512. 
Corcoran, A., & Gillanders, R. (forthcoming), "Foreign Direct Investment and The Ease of Doing Business", 
Review of World Economics. DOI 10.1007/s10290-014-0194-5 
Daude, C., & Stein, E. (2007). The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment. Economics & 
Politics, 19(3), 317-344. 
Dikova, D., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2007). Foreign direct investment mode choice: entry and 
establishment modes in transition economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(6), 1013-1033. 
Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2005). Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. 
European journal of political economy, 21(4), 932-952. 
Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2006). How corruption influences foreign direct investment: a panel data study. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(2), 459-486. 
Fan, C. S., Lin, C., & Treisman, D. (2009). Political decentralization and corruption: evidence from around 
the world. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1), 14-34. 
Fisman, R., & Svensson, J. (2007). Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level 
evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 63-75. 
Gillanders, R. (2014). Corruption and infrastructure at the country and regional level. Journal of 
Development Studies, Volume 50, Number 6, Pages 803-819 
19 
 
Globerman, S., & Shapiro, D. (2005). Assessing international mergers and acquisitions as a mode of foreign 
direct investment. Governance, multinationals and growth, 68-99. 
Habib, M., & Zurawicki, L. (2002). Corruption and foreign direct investment. Journal of international 
business studies, 291-307. 
Hakkala, K. N., Norbäck, P. J., & Svaleryd, H. (2008). Asymmetric effects of corruption on FDI: evidence 
from Swedish multinational firms. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4), 627-642. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: a summary of 
methodology, data and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 5430. 
Kenny, C. (2009). Measuring corruption in infrastructure: Evidence from transition and developing countries. 
The Journal of Development Studies, 45(3), 314-332. 
Knack, S. (2007). Measuring corruption: A critique of indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Journal 
of Public Policy, 27, 255-91 
Ledyaeva, S., Karhunen, P., & Kosonen, R. (2013). Birds of a feather: Evidence on commonality of 
corruption and democracy in the origin and location of foreign investment in Russian regions. European 
Journal of Political Economy, 32, 1-25. 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 110(3), 681-712. 
Morrissey, O., & Udomkerdmongkol, M. (2012). Governance, private investment and foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. World Development, 40(3), 437-445. 
Neto, P., Brandão, A., & Cerqueira, A. (2010). The Macroeconomic Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers 
and Acquisitions and Greenfield Investments. IUP Journal of Business Strategy, 7 
Razafindrakoto, M., & Roubaud, F. (2010). Are international databases on corruption reliable? A comparison 
of expert opinion surveys and household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa. World Development, 38(8), 1057-
1069. 
20 
 
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2006). Using micro-surveys to measure and explain corruption. World 
Development, 34(2), 359-370. 
Svensson, J. (2003). Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of firms. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 207-230. 
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19-42. 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004-2013 
available from http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national 
empirical research?. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 10, 211-244. 
UNCTAD(2014). United Nation Conference on Trade and Development Data on Foreign Direct Investments. 
retrieved from: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx 
UNCTAD WIR (2013). World Investment Report: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development. 
retrieved from: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf 
UNCTAD WIR Methodological Note (2013) 
retrieved from: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2013chMethodNote_en.pdf 
UNDP (2013) United Nations Development Program Data on Education 
available from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data-explorer 
Wei, S. (2000a). How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? Review Of Economics & Statistics, 
82(1), 1-11.  
Wei, S. (2000b). Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2000 
(2), 303-346.  
World Bank and IFC Enterprise Surveys (2014) 
available from: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
21 
 
World Bank Development Indicators (2014) 
available from: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators Dataset (2014) 
available from: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
 
Endnotes 
1 The CPI score was changed to range from a scale of 0-100 in 2012, but for the purposes of this study we converted the 2012 and 2013 scores to 
the previous 0 to10 scale.  
 
2 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/in_detail/. 
3 See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology for the full methodology. 
 
4 The quadrants on the maps show the most recent observation and a country is included in the map only if there were both the 
survey and perception measures available for the same year. 
 
5 Our results are robust to using net inflow of FDI per capita as the dependent variable.  
 
6 These results are robust and even slightly stronger when using alternative FDI inflow data from World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI).  
 
7 Using the trade component of the Doing Business project as our measure of trade costs as is done in Corcoran and Gillanders 
(forthcoming) does not change the results. 
 
8 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Log (Net FDI Inflow) 218 6.444386 2.07377 -3.486542 11.54239 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Log (Value of Greenfield Investment) 178 7.002563 1.954534 -0.1371105 11.21719 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Log (Value of Crossborder M&A sales) 138 5.09026 2.58637 -0.87707 10.7685 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
Perceptions of Corruption 
    
 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 214 3.385981 1.333705 1.5 8.2 Transparency International 
Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5) 228 -0.332463 0.7109995 -1.623821 1.861744 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Experience Based Measures of Corruption 
     
 
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major 
constraint 235 33.3183 19.74747 0 83.7 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Bribery depth (percent of public transactions where a 
gift or informal payment was requested) 165 14.89879 14.81908 0 65.2 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public 
officials "to get things done"  230 30.55174 21.97043 0 87 
 Enterprise Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
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TABLE 2: KEY RESULTS 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Net FDI Inflows 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Constant 5.201*** 6.644*** 6.479*** 6.309*** 6.793*** 4.654*** 5.581*** 5.860*** 6.425*** 6.309*** 6.739*** 
 
(0.357) (0.156) (0.287) (0.239) (0.255) (0.565) (0.606) (0.490) (0.284) (0.240) (0.257)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.432***     0.492*** 0.276* 0.316***                
 
(0.0977)     (0.109) (0.149) (0.105)                
Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5)  0.580***       0.657*** 0.0686 0.390* 
 
 (0.204)       (0.230) (0.295) (0.224)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as   -0.00104   0.0104   0.00744               
a major constraint   (0.00687)   (0.00763)   (0.00765)               
Bribery Depth    -0.00354   -0.00115   -0.00181              
 
   (0.00894)   (0.00990)   (0.0109)              
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to       -0.0126*   -0.00934   -0.00637    
public officials "to get things done"     (0.00646)   (0.00657)   (0.00720)    
R2 0.075 0.033 -0.005 -0.006 0.014 0.079 0.015 0.060 0.033 -0.013 0.021    
N 199 218 218 149 214 199 136 195 218 149 214 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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 TABLE 3: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS WITH CPI AS PERCEPTIONS MEASURE 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Net FDI Inflows     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -19.03*** -17.48*** -19.89*** -16.34*** -17.87*** -17.51*** -18.50*** -19.42*** -17.88*** 
 
(4.357) (4.850) (4.702) (5.970) (5.938) (4.953) (4.711) (5.012) (6.015)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.219***  0.242***  0.206**  0.202** 0.225*** 0.207* 
 
(0.0611)  (0.0631)  (0.0972)  (0.0785) (0.0778) (0.105)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as  -0.00229 0.00370     0.00399 0.000282    
a major constraint  (0.00441) (0.00457)     (0.00461) (0.00524)    
Bribery Depth    -0.00159 0.00165    0.00162    
 
   (0.00672) (0.00733)    (0.00733)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to        -0.00718* -0.00407 -0.00429              
public officials "to get things done"      (0.00405) (0.00456) (0.00472)              
Natural Log of  Inverse Openness -0.751*** -0.682** -0.772** -0.674** -0.733** -0.762** -0.824** -0.848** -0.736** 
 
(0.285) (0.288) (0.300) (0.339) (0.345) (0.343) (0.345) (0.362) (0.368)    
Natural Log of Population 0.967*** 0.907*** 0.973*** 0.890*** 0.956*** 0.923*** 0.983*** 0.989*** 0.957*** 
 
(0.0673) (0.0651) (0.0698) (0.0809) (0.0894) (0.0718) (0.0754) (0.0777) (0.0947)    
Natural Log of Surrounding Market Potential 0.340* 0.332 0.369* 0.293 0.279 0.351* 0.325* 0.358 0.280    
 
(0.180) (0.203) (0.187) (0.259) (0.245) (0.212) (0.194) (0.201) (0.246)    
Natural Log of Skill Level 1.012** 1.233*** 0.955** 1.247** 1.208** 1.017** 0.911* 0.847* 1.200*   
 
(0.449) (0.446) (0.450) (0.521) (0.535) (0.461) (0.465) (0.473) (0.542)    
Low Income Dummy -1.853*** -2.054*** -1.852*** -2.059*** -1.841*** -2.023*** -1.866*** -1.863*** -1.842*** 
 
(0.327) (0.324) (0.330) (0.392) (0.399) (0.332) (0.340) (0.343) (0.406)    
Lower Middle Income Dummy -0.853*** -1.078*** -0.866*** -1.131*** -0.900*** -1.083*** -0.886*** -0.900*** -0.901*** 
 
(0.219) (0.202) (0.221) (0.251) (0.283) (0.214) (0.234) (0.236) (0.285)    
Landlocked Dummy -0.584*** -0.701*** -0.538*** -0.710*** -0.656** -0.674*** -0.593*** -0.544*** -0.653*** 
 
(0.215) (0.206) (0.203) (0.261) (0.264) (0.216) (0.221) (0.206) (0.246)    
Island Dummy -0.218 0.0572 -0.190 0.00146 -0.297 -0.00880 -0.291 -0.264 -0.295    
 
(0.292) (0.407) (0.281) (0.416) (0.302) (0.430) (0.308) (0.295) (0.307)    
R2 0.738 0.719 0.738 0.686 0.699 0.713 0.727 0.727 0.697    
N 151 153 151 117 115 150 148 148 115 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4: ADDITIONAL CONTROLS WITH CC AS PERCEPTIONS MEASURE 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Net FDI Inflows     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -18.42*** -17.48*** -19.30*** -16.34*** -19.47*** -17.51*** -18.09*** -18.99*** -19.54*** 
 
(4.216) (4.850) (4.577) (5.970) (6.099) (4.953) (4.523) (4.852) (6.255)    
Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5) 0.518***  0.569***  0.579**  0.516*** 0.565*** 0.590** 
 
(0.133)  (0.147)  (0.230)  (0.154) (0.164) (0.269)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as  -0.00229 0.00417     0.00424 0.000881    
a major constraint  (0.00441) (0.00471)     (0.00473) (0.00575)    
Bribery Depth    -0.00159 0.00695    0.00691    
 
   (0.00672) (0.00755)    (0.00755)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to        -0.00718* -0.00192 -0.00204              
public officials "to get things done"      (0.00405) (0.00421) (0.00434)              
Natural Log of  Inverse Openness -0.761*** -0.682** -0.789** -0.674** -0.718** -0.762** -0.821** -0.848** -0.725* 
 
(0.288) (0.288) (0.307) (0.339) (0.336) (0.343) (0.340) (0.361) (0.366)    
Natural Log of Population 0.969*** 0.907*** 0.978*** 0.890*** 0.951*** 0.923*** 0.985*** 0.993*** 0.953*** 
 
(0.0674) (0.0651) (0.0721) (0.0809) (0.0877) (0.0718) (0.0759) (0.0805) (0.0964)    
Natural Log of Surrounding Market Potential 0.351** 0.332 0.383** 0.293 0.388 0.351* 0.337* 0.370* 0.390    
 
(0.175) (0.203) (0.183) (0.259) (0.251) (0.212) (0.189) (0.196) (0.255)    
Natural Log of Skill Level 1.017** 1.233*** 0.965** 1.247** 1.228** 1.017** 0.947** 0.892* 1.205** 
 
(0.432) (0.446) (0.441) (0.521) (0.522) (0.461) (0.456) (0.469) (0.537)    
Low Income Dummy -1.811*** -2.054*** -1.805*** -2.059*** -1.807*** -2.023*** -1.829*** -1.823*** -1.809*** 
 
(0.318) (0.324) (0.319) (0.392) (0.379) (0.332) (0.331) (0.332) (0.385)    
Lower Middle Income Dummy -0.840*** -1.078*** -0.854*** -1.131*** -0.892** -1.083*** -0.868*** -0.882*** -0.896*** 
 
(0.222) (0.202) (0.223) (0.251) (0.285) (0.214) (0.235) (0.236) (0.285)    
Landlocked Dummy -0.613*** -0.701*** -0.564*** -0.710*** -0.693*** -0.674*** -0.616*** -0.566*** -0.682*** 
 
(0.207) (0.206) (0.192) (0.261) (0.261) (0.216) (0.210) (0.194) (0.236)    
Island Dummy 0.0261 0.0572 0.0600 0.00146 -0.0423 -0.00880 -0.00328 0.0304 -0.0326    
 
(0.348) (0.407) (0.344) (0.416) (0.330) (0.430) (0.365) (0.361) (0.335)    
R2 0.740 0.719 0.740 0.686 0.702 0.713 0.728 0.728 0.699    
N 153 153 153 117 117 150 150 150 117 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5: GREENFIELD INVESTMENTS AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Value of Greenfield Investments 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -20.21*** -16.82*** -16.36*** -18.99*** -20.45*** -21.61*** -21.20*** -17.36*** -17.84** 
 
(5.086) (5.410) (5.662) (5.948) (6.448) (5.262) (5.241) (5.878) (7.023)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.153**  0.0552  0.250**  0.192** 0.0882 0.123    
 
(0.0643)  (0.0694)  (0.0968)  (0.0856) (0.0937) (0.104)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as  -0.0169*** -0.0144***     -0.0141** -0.0171*** 
a major constraint  (0.00491) (0.00529)     (0.00542) (0.00640)    
Bribery Depth    0.00285 0.0101    0.0110    
 
   (0.00783) (0.00850)    (0.00783)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to        -0.00105 0.00243 0.00138              
public officials "to get things done"      (0.00570) (0.00660) (0.00640)              
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.625 0.659 0.643 0.596 0.594 0.621 0.617 0.635 0.618    
N 150 152 150 115 113 148 146 146 113 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the additional controls from Table 3. 
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TABLE 6: CROSS-BORDER M&A SALES AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Value of Crossborder M&A sales 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant -28.47*** -23.23** -28.92** -17.94 -19.89 -27.74*** -30.11*** -30.44** -20.08    
 
(10.24) (10.83) (11.28) (13.06) (14.13) (10.40) (11.10) (12.13) (14.71)    
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 - 10) 0.496***  0.506***  0.363  0.585*** 0.592*** 0.371    
 
(0.168)  (0.187)  (0.234)  (0.194) (0.213) (0.260)    
Percent of firms identifying corruption as  -0.0170 0.00178     0.00128 0.00149    
a major constraint  (0.0123) (0.0128)     (0.0129) (0.0167)    
Bribery Depth    -0.00323 0.00228    0.00171    
 
   (0.0201) (0.0212)    (0.0226)    
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to        0.0137* 0.0249* 0.0248              
public officials "to get things done"      (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0146)              
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.470 0.431 0.464 0.328 0.344 0.404 0.454 0.448 0.333    
N 105 107 105 75 73 104 102 102 73 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the additional controls from Table 3. 
28 
 
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: CORRUPTION AS A MAJOR CONSTRAINT 
Experienced corruption (x-axis) increases to the right, while perceived corruption (y-axis) increases downwards 
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FIGURE 2: FIRMS EXPECTED TO GIVE GIFTS TO “GET THINGS DONE” 
Experienced corruption (x-axis) increases to the right, while perceived corruption (y-axis) increases downwards 
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FIGURE 3: BRIBERY DEPTH 
Experienced corruption (x-axis) increases to the right, while perceived corruption (y-axis) increases downwards 
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   FIGURE 4: CPI VERSUS PERCENT OF FIRMS IDENTIFYING CORRUPTION AS A MAJOR CONSTRAINT 
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FIGURE 5: CPI VERSUS PERCENT OF FIRMS EXPECTED TO GIVE GIFTS TO GET THINGS DONE 
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          FIGURE 6: CPI VERSUS BRIBERY DEPTH 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: DESCRIPTION OF MAIN VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variables 
  Log (Net FDI Inflow) Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, constant 2005 US$) UNCTAD 
Log (Value of Greenfield 
Investment) 
Natural logarithm of the value of greenfield investments (new investments 
built from zero), net  (constant 2005 US$) UNCTAD 
Log (Value of Crossborder M&A 
sales) 
Natural logarithm of the value of merger and acquisitions sales, net sales 
(constant 2005 US$) UNCTAD 
Controls 
 
 
Log (GDP) Natural logarithm of GDP (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Imports Imports of goods and services  (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Exports Exports of goods and services  (BoP, constant 2005 US$) WDI 
Log (Population) Natural logarithm of population   WDI 
Log (Skill Level) Natural logarithm of expected years of schooling UNDP 
Log(Inverse of Openness) log(GDP/Import+Exports), (BoP, constant 2005 US$) Constructed 
Log(Surrounding Market Potential) Natural logarithm of distance weighted sum of global GDPs Constructed 
Landlocked Dummy 1 if country is land locked, 0 otherwise CEPII 
Island Dummy 1 if country is an island, 0 otherwise Constructed 
Low Income Dummy 1 if country is classified as low income (GNI per capita 1 035 US$ or less), 0 otherwise 
World Bank, 
constructed  
Lower Middle Income Dummy 1 if country is classified as lower middle income (GNI per capita from 1 036 to 4 085 US$), 0 otherwise 
World Bank, 
constructed  
Perceptions of Corruption  
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index, ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean)* 
Transparency 
International 
Control of Corruption Perceptions of government corruption, ranging from -2.5 (very corrupt) to 2.5 (very little or no corruption) 
 
World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Experience Based Measures of 
Corruption 
 
 
Bribery depth (percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested) 
Enterprise 
Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done"  
Enterprise 
Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint 
Enterprise 
Surveys (World 
Bank and IFC) 
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